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themselves. The problem of leadership, for example, was never properly 
resolved by the rondas: most ronda leaders were unable to cope with excessive 
burdens of responsibility and accountability that the position demanded. Many 
left their villages after standing down. Nevertheless, Starn concludes, and one is 
inclined to agree with him, the balance is largely positive. The rondas made a 
significant difference to peasants' livelihoods at the local level. Moreover, they 
contributed to a changing perception of the peasantry in Peru's cities and helped 
put peasant issues back on the political agenda. 
Starn's presence, indeed participation, in the story of rondas adds a 
fascinating anecdotal dimension to the narrative. This is not a stale monograph 
written at arm's length by a supposedly impartial observer. Starn takes part in the 
patrols, he sits in the "justice-malung" meetings, he helps dig the grave of a 
young girl who dies of dysentery, he gets an NGO in Lima to h n d  a water project 
in the village of Iraca Grande. Starn's hands-on approach extends to whipping 
himself to gauge the pain of ronda justice. In the village of Tunnel Six where he 
carried out much of his ethnographic work, Starn becomes a source of loans for 
the cash-strapped peasants. However, Starn's participation produced conflicts. 
Starn recalls with shame the day he stood by as a rustler was tortured by the 
ronderos. He feels uneasy with the secondary role of women in the rondas. 
These aspects of the book add to rather than obfuscate the story. Starn's presence 
is never obtrusive; the anthropologist, and at times Robin Kirk, his compaiiera, 
appear not out of a desire to bask in the narrative limelight, but because their role 
in the events is part and parcel of the ethnographic record. 
Nightwatch is an elegantly crafted and important book that deserves a 
readership that extends far beyond the confines of Latin American anthropology 
and Peruvian studies. It successfully meshes a gripping narrative with an 
engaging discussion of key themes, ranging from the nature of fieldwork to 
peasant resistance and globalisation. More important, it brings to light one of the 
most important Latin American peasant movements of the twentieth century, 
until now overshadowed by the dramatic impact of the Shining Path on Peru. 
Paulo Drinot 
St Antony's College, Oxford 
John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and Interna.tiona1 
Terrorism, (second edition) (London: Pluto Press, 2000). 
The very best book on the tragedy of Sept. 1 I th, 200 1, is more than two years old. 
First published in 1999 and re-issued in an expanded second edition a year later, 
John K. Cooley's Unholy Wars is a remarkably prescient guide to the foreign 
policy machinations that led to the attacks on the United States by Islamic 
extremists. Although Cooley is a veteran journalist with many years of 
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experience at ABC News, he does not suffer from the chronic forgetfulness of 
his professions. Unlike other reporters, he remembers well a time when the 
United States found it useful to ally itself with "some of the most conservative 
and fanatical followers of Islam." His book is a measured assessment of the 
terrible price this alliance inflicted on innocent civilians all over the world. 
The story begins in the late 1970s when the United States government was 
worried about its diminishing international power in the wake of the Vietnam 
War. In response to this perceived failure, the U.S. started to shore up its position 
in the Middle East by closely allying itself with Islamic religious conservatives. 
The main partners of this alliance were Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan. The 
governments of these nations were seen as reliable bulwarks against communist 
aggression. The fall of the Shah in Iran and increasing Soviet activity in 
Afghanistan womed all these nations and drew them together in a very tight 
network, similar to the anti-communist alliance that also emerged in South 
America in the 1970s. 
As Cooiey notes, one ofthe main instigators of this Islamic anti-communist 
alliance was Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was then serving as National Security 
Advisor under President Jimrny Carter. In 1979, Brzezinski became interested 
in Afghanistan as a possible battleground for deploying the forces of Islamic 
religious conservatives against the Soviet Union. As Brzezinski admitted in 
1997 in an interview in Le Nouvel Obsewateur, the United States allied itself to 
anti-soviet forces in Afghanistan, notably the famous holy warriors known as 
the Mujahadeen, even prior to the Soviet invasion of December 1979. 
"According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began 
during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 
1979," Brzezinski told the French newspaper. "But the reality, secretly guarded 
until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President 
Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet 
regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I 
explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military 
intervention.. . We didn't push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly 
increased the probability that they would." 
Jimmy Carter's successor Ronald Reagan greatly expanded the policy 
begun by Brzezinski. During the 1980s, the United States government, working 
closely with the governments of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, supplied more than 
three billion dollars of assistance to the Mujahadeen. During the 1980s, 
independent journalists such as Alexander Cockburn and Robert Fisk accurately 
described the Mujahadeen as dangerous religious fanatics, notable for their 
cruel misogynist treatment of women. These reports were ignored in the 
mainstream media, which preferred to lionize the Mujahadeen as brave 
"freedom fighters." 
Cooley astutely notes that the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s was truly an 
international struggle, The call for a holy war against communism attracted 
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young men from all over the Islamic world, notably the Saudi millionaire Usama 
bin Laden. Having ample funds of his own, bin Laden was not directly financed 
by the United States. However, bin Laden was nurtured and supported by the 
web of alliances the United States created. 
This web of alliances, held together by anti-communism, was global in 
scope. Hence Saudi money helped arm the Contras fighting in Nicaragua. Rogue 
financial institutions such as the Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(BCCI) provided cover for the numerous money laundering operations required 
by this alliance. The Iran-Contra scandal was a by-product of this alliance 
system. 
As a key player in Afghanistan in the 1980s, bin Laden learned to how to 
organize an illicit international organization, how to transfer and launder money, 
and how to think in global terms. In a very real way, bin Laden's AI-Quaeda 
organization, which is being blamed for many terrorists attacks in addition to the 
Sept. 1 1 atrocities, was born in Afghanistan in the 1980s. 
The rest of the story is well known. The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan 
in 1989. In the wake of their departure, the country fell into civil war and chaos, 
eventually leading to the triumph of the Taliban. Seizing power in Afghanistan in 
1996, the Taliban enforced a regime notable for its extreme religious fanaticism 
and suppression of women. The Taliban would also, of course, provide sanctuary 
to bin Laden, setting the stage for more tragedy both in Afghanistan and the 
United States. 
In general, the architects of U.S. foreign policy remain proud of what they 
have wrought. In 1997 Brzezinski said there was no grounds for regrets. "What 
is most important to the history of the world?" Brzezinski asked "The Taliban or 
the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of 
Central Europe and the end of the cold war?" These were meant to be rhetorical 
questions but not everyone will find the answers so self-evident. The skeptically 
~nclined might wonder if it was not possible that the decrepit Soviet Union of the 
1970s and 1980s could have been challenged without stirring up a brutal 
religious war. 
In any case, Cooley's book usefully reminds us that religious extremism is 
not an inherent product of Islamic society. Indeed, historically, religious 
fanaticism has often been nurtured by state agencies with their own agenda. Of 
course, there are also social forces behind the worldwide rise of religious 
extremism. Cooley's book, focusing as it does on politics and foreign policy, 
glides over these sociological forces. Hence his book needs to be supplemented 
by other books on the Middle East that provide a thlcker description of every-day 
life. Despite this flaw, his book is clearly written and extremely valuable guide to 
the diplomatic history of the Middle East over the last thirty years. Anyone 
seeking to get their bearings on the events of Sept. 1 l th should turn to Cooley for 
guidance. 
Jeet Heer 
York University 
